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Abstract
Before the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09, the Bank of England regularly used monthly
Long-Term Repo (LTR) operations at a range of maturities to manage its balance sheet. As
market liquidity tightened in late 2007, the Bank introduced the Extended Collateral LongTerm Repo (ELTR) program to lend larger amounts of sterling cash against a wider set of
collateral at three-month maturities. In June 2010, the Bank replaced the ELTRs with the
Indexed Long-Term Repo (ILTR) program to make the wider set of collateral a permanent
part of its toolkit. The ILTR operations auctioned liquidity at three- and six-month maturities
against an expanded set of collateral and at cheaper rates than the ELTRs. The Bank designed
the ILTRs as a multi-good auction, a new technique that had the advantages of auctioning
liquidity against specific levels of collateral that varied in quality. According to officials at the
Bank, this is a unique innovation in liquidity provision. Counterparties could submit bids
against a “narrow” set of collateral, a “wider” set, or both in a “paired” bid. In times of stress,
the ILTRs automatically allocate a greater proportion of liquidity against less-liquid
collateral. All successful bidders paid the lowest accepted bid on each collateral set. In 2014,
the Bank made changes to the ILTR operations by standardizing the maturity offered,
introducing a variable liquidity supply, expanding the collateral, and recalibrating to yield
lower prices. The new ILTR operations respond to market-wide stress by lending a greater
proportion of funds against less-liquid collateral and an increased amount of overall liquidity
due to the lack of a fixed supply
Keywords: Auction theory, Bank of England, Indexed-Long-Term Repo, ILTR, Sterling
Monetary Framework, United Kingdom

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
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Overview
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the
Bank of England (the Bank) used long-term
repo operations (LTRs) at a range of
maturities to manage its balance sheet (Frost,
Govier, and Horn 2015). The operations did
not provide a significant amount of liquidity
to the banking sector, but that changed in
2007. To restore liquidity to frozen funding
markets, especially against less liquid
collateral, the Bank in December 2007
introduced Extended Collateral Long-Term
Repo (ELTR) operations (Fulmer 2022b). The
ELTRs exchanged sterling cash for an
expanded set of less liquid collateral at threemonth maturities. The ELTRs utilized a
discriminatory price auction in which
successful bidders paid their own bid, and a
single-good
auction
format
wherein
counterparties initially bid against a single
pool of eligible collateral and later faced
different minimum bids across collateral sets
within the same auction (Frost, Govier, and
Horn 2015).

Key Terms
Purpose: To “provide liquidity insurance without
distorting banks’ incentives for prudent liquidity
management, and whilst minimising the risk being
taken onto the Bank’s own balance sheet” (Bank of
England 2010a)
Launch Dates

June 2010
(first iteration)
February 2014
(second iteration)

Expiration Dates

n/a

Legal Authority

Pre-existing authority

Peak Outstanding

GBP 29 billion (July
2020)

Participants

Banks and building
societies

Rate

Successful bidders paid
the lowest accepted bid
on each collateral set

As the stress of the GFC passed, the Bank
Collateral
Two, later three, sets of
decided to make the broader pool of
eligible collateral that
collateral a permanent feature of its LTRs. In
were bid on separately
June 2010, the Bank of England replaced the
Initially three- and sixELTRs with Indexed Long-Term Repo (ILTR) Loan Duration
month maturity
operations, which utilized a much more
options; later
sophisticated design derived from auction
standardized to only six
theory. The ILTRs used a multi-good auction
months
format; counterparties split their eligible
collateral into two pools: “narrow,” which Notable Features
Standing facility;
sophisticated auction
consisted
of
high-quality
sovereign
theory; variable supply;
securities, and “wider,” which included a
participants could bid
wide range of highly rated but less liquid
on separate sets of
securities (Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015).
collateral
Counterparties
submitted
bids
simultaneously against either set of eligible Outcomes
No notable issues or
breakdowns in liquidity
collateral or both, using a “paired” bid (Bank
provision
of England 2010a). All successful bidders
paid the lowest accepted bid on each
collateral set, expressed as a spread to the Bank Rate (Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011).
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Every calendar quarter, the Bank offered two ILTR auctions at a term of three months and
one auction at a term of six months (Bank of England 2010a).
In 2012, the Bank of England released the Winters Review, an independent review which
assessed how the Bank provided liquidity to the financial system and considered the new
programs created during the Global Financial Crisis (Winters 2012). This report
recommended that the Bank of England combine the ILTR facility with the Extended
Collateral Term Repo facility (ECTR), a shorter-term liquidity facility the Bank had created
in 2011 during the euro crisis that accepted a broader range of collateral than the ILTRs.
Instead of merging these two facilities, the Bank of England decided to significantly expand
the ILTR facility in 2014 by setting the maturity for all auctions at six months, further
extending the eligible set of collateral by introducing a third set, tying the quantity of
liquidity offered to market conditions, and recalibrating to yield lower prices (Bank of
England 2013). Additionally, they retained the ECTR facility as an adaptable contingent
facility in case of a future crisis (Fulmer 2022a). For this case, ILTRs prior to 2014 will be
referred to as “the first iteration” and those occurring in or after 2014 will be referred to as
“the second iteration.”
Summary Evaluation
The Bank of England has boasted of the ILTR’s design and implementation. The former
Governor of the Bank of England referred to the ILTR design as “a marvellous application of
theoretical economics to a practical program of vital importance” (The Economist 2012). A
Deputy Governor called the operations “a world first in central banking... potentially a major
step forward in practical policies to support financial stability” (Klemperer 2018).
While the ILTRs were nearly fully subscribed at the start, uptake dropped significantly
around 2012 (see Figure 1). The Winters Review (2012) provided three factors that may
explain this low uptake. First, there was low demand for reserves against a narrow set of
collateral as a result of the Bank’s quantitative easing program, as well as widespread
availability on the private market. Second, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis,
banks had reduced their holding of assets that would fall into the wider set of collateral. The
value of this wider collateral dropped as a result of stricter regulatory changes that ruled
some of these assets illiquid. Thus, banks had a much lower need to obtain liquidity against
the collateral pool targeted by the facility. Last, the relatively short term of the ILTRs did not
help the banks reach their regulatory liquidity requirements, a common reason to borrow
from refinancing operations. The post-crisis regulatory requirements only recognized
funding with more than three months of remaining maturity, which excluded the majority of
ILTR funding (Winters 2012).
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Figure 1: Allocation of ILTRs in the First Iteration

Source: Bank of England n.d.b.

In 2018, the Bank of England released an updated evaluation of its liquidity facilities,
including the ILTRs. In the section regarding the ILTRs, the Bank stated that, “As we
understand, no other central bank has employed such a sophisticated approach”
(Independent Evaluation Office 2018). While there was some increased usage around the EU
referendum, the Bank noted in 2018 that “the auction mechanism is yet to be tested in a
severe liquidity stress” (Independent Evaluation Office 2018). Indeed, participants only paid
above the minimum price in two auctions from 2013–16. However, the Covid pandemic has
somewhat tested the system since, shown by a large increase in usage (and higher prices) in
March 2020. (See Figure 2 for the allocation of ILTRs in the second iteration across the three
collateral sets. Note that this figure uses a slightly different y-axis scale than Figure 1.)

1129

United Kingdom

Fulmer

Figure 2: Allocation of ILTRs in the Second Iteration

Source: Bank of England n.d.a.
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Context: United Kingdom 2010–2011

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$2.482 trillion in 2010
$2.662 trillion in 2011
$39,436 in 2010
$42,039 in 2011
Data for 2010:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2011:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAAu
Fitch: AAA
$4.635 trillion in 2010
$4.708 trillion in 2011
186.72% in 2010
176.83% in 2011
Data not available for 2010
Data not available for 2011
76% in 2010
76% in 2011
15% in 2010
15% in 2011
26% in 2010
Data not available for 2011
100% insurance on deposits up to
£85,000 in 2010
100% insurance on deposits up to
£85,000 in 2011

Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset, Cull et al. “Bank Ownership–Trends and
Implications.”
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The ILTR program was a standing facility that the Bank of England used
to provide liquidity insurance to the banking sector.
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Bank of England expanded its open market
operations (OMOs), both in size and eligible collateral (Bank of England 2010a). While the
specific actions the Bank took during the crisis were nominally temporary, the Bank stated
in a 2008 consultative paper that it intended to permanently expand the eligible collateral of
long-term repo operations (Bank of England 2008c). The ILTRs replaced the three-month,
extended-collateral, long-term (ELTR) repos that the Bank had created in December 2007,
at the height of the crisis. It also replaced the regular three-, six-, nine-, and twelve-month
long-term repos the Bank conducted (Bank of England 2010b).
In a position paper describing the structure of the ILTRs, the Bank stated the guiding purpose
of the operations (Bank of England 2010a):
The primary objective of the new operations is to provide liquidity insurance without
distorting banks’ incentives for prudent liquidity management, and whilst minimising
the risk being taken onto the Bank’s own balance sheet.
In the explanation of the second iteration of the ILTRs, the Bank provided another
description of the ILTRs’ purpose (Bank of England 2013):
Banks seeking a regular source of liquidity against the widest range of collateral should
expect to rely primarily on the monthly ILTR auctions… with the Bank being willing to
supply an increasing amount of liquidity as signs of market stress rise.
2. Legal Authority: The Bank of England utilized its pre-existing authority to
implement financial operations in times of stress to create the ILTRs.
In 2006, HM Treasury, the Bank of England, and the Financial Services Authority signed a
memorandum of understanding establishing their individual responsibilities and powers as
they relate to matters of financial stability. This memorandum stated that the Bank of
England operates in “the markets to deal with fluctuations in liquidity” and can undertake,
in times of crisis, “financial operations … in order to limit the risk of problems in or affecting
particular institutions spreading to other parts of the financial system” (HMT, BOE, FSA
2006). The memorandum further provided instructions on how the Bank can respond to a
crisis of financial stability.
The Bank would have specific responsibility for (HMT, BOE, FSA 2006, sec. 17[ii]):
maintaining, through its market operations and as banker to the banking system,
operational contacts with market participants so as to monitor and, as necessary,
facilitate the functioning of UK markets; this may include the provision of liquidity
assistance or other support operations.

1132

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

Consistent with the memorandum of understanding, the Bank relied on its pre-existing
authority to implement financial operations in times of stress to create the ILTRs. The Bank
never refers to specific legislation in any of its discussion of ILTRs, and research could not
determine legislation that narrowly authorized a program like the ILTRs. The Winters
Review, which analyzed the Bank’s approach to liquidity provision, never mentioned
legislation or statutory authority, instead focusing on the wide range of authority vested in
the Governor of the Bank (Winters 2012). Therefore, it seems likely that the Bank is
relatively unrestricted in its power to implement lending programs.
3. Part of a Package: The Bank of England did not introduce the ILTRs in a package
with other facilities, but changes in 2013–14 to the ILTRs accompanied
adjustments to the Bank’s liquidity provision framework.
In 2008, the Bank released a consultative paper on the development of the Bank’s market
operations. In this paper, the Bank stated that it intended to permanently expand the
temporary ELTR operations but sought consultations from market participants first in order
to determine the best structure. Therefore, the Bank did not unveil the ILTR operations in
2010 in response to financial instability, but rather as a result of lessons learned from the
GFC. In fact, the paper stated that it focused on “plans for a permanent framework that will
persist once the current crisis has eventually passed” (Bank of England 2008c). Due to this,
the Bank did not create the ILTRs in a package along with other facilities.
In 2013–14, the Bank adjusted its long-term repo operations again. This time, the Bank
responded to critiques of its liquidity provision facilities in the Winters Report. In addition
to changes to the ILTRs, the Bank repriced and adjusted the Discount Window Facility to
make it more accessible to participants, broadened the collateral eligible for its liquidity
facilities, agreed to work closer with regulators to ensure that liquidity provision did not
hinder regulatory efforts, and implemented stronger governance of its liquidity provision
framework, along with other changes (Bank of England 2013).
4. Management: The Bank of England managed the ILTR operations as a permanent
facility in its Sterling Monetary Framework.
The Bank of England operated the ILTR operations as a part of its Sterling Monetary
Framework (Bank of England 2010b). Since the ILTRs are an adapted form of its regular open
market operations, the Bank of England did not implement specific oversight measures. It
did, however, commission its Independent Evaluation Office in 2016 to assess its liquidity
provision framework (including the ILTR), with the results released in 2018. This report
states that the Financial Policy Committee received “formal authority” in 2017 to approve
adjustments to the liquidity facilities operated by the Bank (Independent Evaluation Office
2018). Prior to this, it had a merely advisory role, with the Governor of the Bank maintaining
sole authority over the ILTR program.
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5. Administration: The ILTRs allocate liquidity to bidders using a sophisticated
design structure informed by theoretical auction theory.
Auction Design
The ELTR program, which was the precursor to the ILTR, functioned as a single-good auction
with discriminatory pricing. Under this design, counterparties bid against a single pool of
collateral and, if successful, paid the rate that they bid (Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015). As the
Bank expanded the eligible set of collateral for ELTRs, it introduced a minimum bid of 50
basis points for bids against the expanded, less-liquid set of collateral (Bank of England
2008b). (See Figure 3 for a breakdown of changes in auction design.)
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Figure 3: Comparison of Major Components of ELTRs and ILTRs
Program

ELTR
(precursor to the
ILTR)

ILTR
(First Iteration)

ILTR
(Second Iteration)

Type of Auction

Single-good auction
with discriminatory
pricing (modified to
include different
minimum bids across
collateral sets)

Product-mix, multigood auction with
uniform pricing

Product-mix, multi-good
auction with uniform
pricing

Collateral Groups

One pool

Two pools

Three pools

Permitted Bids

10 bids allowed, but
<20% of the total
funds available during
an auction

Unlimited but <30%
of the total funds
available during an
auction

Unlimited number of bids
and quantity of requested
liquidity

Rate
Determination

Bank accepts bids,
high to low, until all
amounts allocated

Bank determines cutoff price for each pool
of collateral (Clearing
Spread)

Bank determines cut-off
price for each pool of
collateral (Clearing
Spread)

Rate Paid by
Successful
Bidders

Rate Bid

Cut-off price for the
pool

Cut-off price for the pool

Allocation

Highest bids accepted
until all offered funds
allocated

All bids above the cutoff price are accepted

All bids above the cut-off
price are accepted

Frequency

Varied (from weekly
to monthly)

Monthly

Monthly (weekly during
times of stress)

Fixed vs. Variable
Supply of
Liquidity

Fixed

Fixed

Variable

Sources: Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011; Bank of England 2010a.

In 2010, the new ILTR operations utilized a multi-good auction with uniform pricing, which
the Bank called a “product-mix auction” (Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015; Fisher, Frost, and
Weeken 2011).3 In a product-mix auction, multiple products are available and participants
can bid multiple times, both within and across varieties (Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011).
For example, a participant could submit a single bid to purchase 50 units of the premium
3

Paul Klemperer invented the concept for a product-mix auction in 2007–08 for the Bank (Klemperer 2018).
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quality good for $100 per unit or to purchase 50 units of the standard quality good for $75
per unit. The auctioneer would then consider all of the bids submitted and determine a cutoff price per unit for each variety of product.4 The auctioneer would accept every bid above
the cut-off price and the bidders would pay the cut-off price (Fisher, Frost, and Weeken
2011).
In the first iteration of the ILTRs, the bidders were the counterparties eligible for the
operations and the products were the “wider” and “narrow” sets of eligible collateral. Eligible
counterparties could bid for sterling cash against either set of eligible collateral or both,
known as a “paired” bid (Bank of England 2010a). The Bank called the accepted cut-off price
the “clearing spread.”
The other dimension by which liquidity operations can vary is the size of allotment. The Bank
of England did not fix the proportion of funds allocated to the wider and narrow sets of
collateral (Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011). Instead, the proportion of liquidity provided to
each collateral pool depended on the intersection point of two important components: the
allocation frontier and the relative supply schedule (RSS).
ILTR auctions determine one cut-off price for each set of collateral. The Bank does this by
first constructing a demand curve, known as the allocation frontier, from the submitted bids.
This allocation frontier maps out the difference between the two cut-off prices against the
proportion of liquidity demanded against the wider collateral set. The intersection of this
frontier with the Bank's supply schedule then determines the percentage allocated to wider
collateral and the difference between the cutoff prices, from which it is possible to determine
the actual cut-off price for each set of collateral (Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011). See Figure
4 for an example of this. In terms of the economics, this means that the auction automatically
adjusts to implement the competitive equilibrium. Since the ILTRs allow banks to submit
more sophisticated bids that more closely resemble their funding needs, cut-off prices,
especially for the wider set of collateral, therefore rise during times of systemic stress,
providing the Bank with an “early warning indicator” (Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011).
The relative supply schedule represented the supply preferences of the Bank of England
(Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011). The Bank determined this supply schedule (prior to the
auction) according to three considerations:
•

The Bank wanted to regularly allocate funds against wider collateral in times of
financial stability, in order to ensure that counterparties understood the design and
process.

•

The Bank should not undermine counterparties’ incentives to prudently manage

In the case of a paired bid where more than one of the sub-bids are accepted, the auctioneer accepts the bid
that is the greatest distance above its respective cut-off price. Using the same example, if the cut-off price for
the premium and standard quality goods were $90 and $70, respectively, then the bidder would receive 50
units of the premium good at $90 per unit, since the bidder gets $10 of value from that exchange (the difference
between her bid and the price she pays) relative to $5 for the standard quality good (Fisher, Frost, and Weeken
2011).
4
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their liquidity (the moral hazard concern).
•

In times of stress, the ILTR auctions should allocate a greater proportion of funds
against wider collateral.

The Bank of England has not publicly released its actual relative supply schedule, further
reducing any scope for counterparties to game the system (Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011).
Figure 4 provides a highly stylized example of how the Bank used the allocation frontier and
the relative supply schedule to determine the allocation of liquidity. The downward-sloping
step-wise functions are the allocation frontiers, depending on the level of stress affecting the
banking sector. The upward-sloping red line represents the relative supply schedule of the
Bank. The point of intersection between the two components represents the equilibrium
level of liquidity allocation. Note that a situation with systemic stress results in an expansion
in lending against wider collateral, while a single instance of stress to one bank does not
typically affect the allocation. However, a very large, systemically important institution with
a high-liquidity request could cause the allocation to increase.
Figure 4: Stylized Equilibrium Example

Source: Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011.

This process became more complex with the addition of a third set of collateral in the second
iteration of the ILTRs (see Key Design Decision No. 11, “Eligible Collateral”). The Bank
referred to the new set as “Level C;” narrow collateral was “Level A;” and the original wider
set was “Level B.” Along with three closing spreads, the new ILTRs used two supply curves.
The first curve determined the proportion of liquidity allocated to Levels B and C collateral
combined. The second curve then split that proportion between Levels B and C. For example,
if the prices and quantities bid on Levels B and C were relatively high compared to Level A,
a greater proportion of liquidity would go to Levels B and C. Likewise, if the prices and
quantities bid on Level C were relatively high compared to Level B, a greater proportion of
funds would go to Level C (Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015).
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Again, the Bank did not reveal the details of the two supply curves it used to determine
allocations. However, the Bank did state the following two principles guiding the curves:
•

The Bank wants to lend a limited proportion of liquidity against each collateral set,
likely so that participants understand the process for times of stress and

•

the ILTR operations should automatically provide more liquidity against a collateral
set if the demand for liquidity against that set increases (Frost, Govier, and Horn
2015).

Frequency
Initially, ILTR operations occurred once a month (Bank of England n.d.b).
In September 2014, the Bank’s Governors considered increasing the frequency of ILTRs to
prepare for the upcoming Scotland independence referendum. If the “yes” side won the
referendum, the Bank planned to immediately announce weekly ILTR operations until the
already scheduled operation in October. The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) of the Bank
advised avoiding pre-announcements of these operations as it could spark unintended panic
(Bank of England 2014b). However, this contingency was not activated as the “yes” side
failed (Independent Evaluation Office 2018).
As the EU Referendum approached in June 2016, the Bank again began preparing
contingency plans in March 2016 (Bank of England 2016). The FPC welcomed the Bank’s
early announcement of weekly ILTR operations timed around the referendum, which
contrasted with the FPC’s reticence to announce weekly ILTRs prior to the Scotland
referendum (Independent Evaluation Office 2018). From June to September 2016, the Bank
conducted weekly ILTRs (Bank of England n.d.a). (See Figure 5 for a graphical representation
of how ILTR operations allocate more funds in times of financial stress, as the Scotland
referendum failed but the EU referendum passed.)
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Figure 5: ILTR Allocation around the Scotland and EU Referenda

Source: Independent Evaluation Office 2018.

As the UK came closer to officially leaving the EU, the Bank again implemented weekly ILTRs
from mid-March to the end of April 2019 (Bank of England n.d.a). The Bank continuously
extended weekly ILTRs until October 2019, when the Bank announced that the ILTRs would
be weekly until further notice (Bank of England 2019a; 2019b). Soon after the United
Kingdom officially left the European Union on January 31, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic
spread globally, ensuring that the ILTRs continued to operate on a weekly basis (Bank of
England n.d.a).
6. Eligible Participants: Institutions that could participate in open market
operations at the Bank and report Eligible Liabilities to the Bank were eligible for
the ILTR operations.
Institutions that could both participate in open-market operations at the Bank and report
Eligible Liabilities to the Bank were eligible for the ILTR operations (Bank of England 2010b).
The Bank allowed the following institutions to participate in OMOs:
•

Banks and building societies5 eligible to participate in the reserves scheme

•

Other banks, building societies, and securities dealers authorized under the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 that are active intermediaries in the
sterling markets (Bank of England 2008a)

In its explanation of the second iteration of the ILTRs, the Bank noted that banks had
expressed uncertainty about who was eligible for the facilities in the Sterling Monetary
Framework, which includes the ILTRs. The Bank stated that all banks and building societies
A building society is a financial institution owned by its members that provides mortgage loans and savings
accounts.
5
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authorized by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) should have full access to the
Sterling Monetary Framework (Bank of England 2013).
The Bank of England noted that the ILTR operations were not Shari’ah compliant. Islamic
banking prohibits the payment or receipt of interest and the ILTRs were interest-based. To
account for this, the Bank of England created a secondary liquidity facility for Islamic banks
that could not access liquidity through the Sterling Monetary Framework (Rahman 2017).
7. Funding Source and Allocation: The Bank of England funded the ILTR operations
on its balance sheet.
Like its regular OMOs, the Bank of England financed the ILTRs on its balance sheet. The Bank
did not predetermine an amount allocated to ILTR operations as they were a permanent
standing facility in the Sterling Monetary Framework.
8. Program Size: Initially, ILTR auctions had a fixed supply of liquidity available, but
the second iteration transitioned to a variable supply dependent on market
conditions.
The ILTRs served as a permanent standing facility in the Sterling Monetary Framework and
thus, did not have a set total size. In the position paper detailing the operations, the Bank
anticipated that about GBP 15 billion would be offered in each calendar quarter, across three
auctions. However, the Bank noted that it could increase this amount if the bids revealed
strained financial conditions (Bank of England 2010a).
During the first iteration of the ILTRs (from June 2010 to February 2014), the Bank actually
undershot this framework, offering two GBP 5 billion auctions at a three-month maturity and
one GBP 2.5 billion auction at a six-month maturity every calendar quarter for a total of GBP
12.5 billion. In total, during the first iteration, the Bank lent about GBP 71 billion across 44
auctions. While the ILTRs were nearly fully subscribed at the start, uptake dropped
significantly around 2012, with the remaining operations only once reaching above 10%
subscription (Bank of England n.d.b).6 See Figure 6 for this dynamic over time. This figure
shows the cumulative sum of bids against the narrow and wider set of collateral, relative to
the cumulative sum of auction sizes (known as a cover ratio). That is, in the entirety of the
first iteration of the ILTRs, participants had bid on a little more than half of the liquidity
offered in auctions by the Bank. At the start of the ILTRs, this is much higher, as earlier
auctions were oversubscribed, but as market conditions normalized, less demand for
liquidity for the Bank brings this cumulative cover ratio down.

6 While the Bank

of England did make significant changes to the ILTR design in 2014, the drop-off in ILTR usage
from 2012 to 2014 might have been demand-driven, due to the introduction of other facilities (such as the
Funding for Lending Scheme and ECTR operations) and increased liquidity supply from the Euro area. For more
detailed information regarding other facilities, see Fulmer 2022a and Churm et al 2012.
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Figure 6: Cumulative Cover Ratio for the First Iteration of ILTRs

Source: Bank of England n.d.b.

In the second iteration of the ILTRs, the Bank removed the fixed-total-size element of its
auctions. Instead, the ILTR operations provided a greater amount of liquidity in each auction
if the pattern of bids submitted indicated an increase in market stress (Bank of England
2014a).
If the Bank of England continued to use a fixed auction amount, this would have resulted in
higher spreads paid by successful bidders in times of crisis. In contrast, moving to a variable
supply allowed for both a lower price of participation and a higher quantity of liquidity
provided to the system. Although the Bank has not made its exact supply function public
information, it is an upward-sloping supply curve (Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015). Figure 7
provides the Bank’s stylized depiction of the dynamic at play in the supply of ILTRs.
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Figure 7: Variable versus Fixed Supply

Source: Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015.

Since the second iteration of the ILTRs removed the fixed supply of liquidity on offer, it is not
possible to graph the cover ratio of each ILTR operation over time. Instead, Figure 8 shows
the cumulative amount of liquidity allocated by collateral type. As a result of the new variable
supply function in the ILTRs, an increased amount of liquidity allocated should signal
systemic instability.
Figure 8: Cumulative Amount Allocated to Bidders in the Second Iteration

Source: Bank of England n.d.a.
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As an example, Figure 9 shows the allocation percentages in individual auctions across the
collateral sets during the COVID crisis in 2020. In February and March of that year, the
amount of ILTR operations allocated against bids using the least liquid set of collateral
clearly demonstrates the market stress faced by participants at that time.
Figure 9: Allocation during 2020 across Collateral Sets

Source: Bank of England n.d.a.

9. Individual Participation Limits: The Bank of England initially limited the overall
size of participant bids but removed this restriction along with the fixed supply of
liquidity.
The Bank did not initially place a limit on the number of bids that a counterparty could
submit during an auction. However, the combined bids could not exceed 30% of the total
funds offered. The Bank allowed a minimum bid of GBP 5 million, and higher bids at GBP 1
million increments (Bank of England 2010b).
Along with other changes, the second iteration of the ILTRs removed the maximum limits on
bid size since the amount of liquidity being offered was no longer limited. However, the
minimum bid and minimum bid increments remained at GBP 5 million and GBP 1 million,
respectively (Bank of England 2014a).
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10. Rate Charged on Operations: ILTR operations utilized a uniform pricing structure,
where successful bidders paid the lowest accepted spread.
The ILTR operations used a uniform pricing structure, in which successful bidders paid the
clearing spread applicable to each set of collateral (Bank of England 2010b). Bidders
expressed their offers as a spread above the Bank Rate (in whole basis points)(Fisher, Frost,
and Weeken 2011). The Bank calculated the interest charged on the ILTRs on a daily basis,
using the sum of the Bank Rate at the close of the business day plus the applicable clearing
spread for the set of collateral used in the operation. The total interest due for an ILTR
drawing was the sum of those daily accruals (Bank of England 2010b).
The Bank noted in its position paper describing the operations that indexing the operations
to the Bank Rate allowed it to avoid exposure to market fluctuations and freed banks from
projecting the future path of interest rates (Bank of England 2010a). Previously, the ELTRs
did not index their rates to the Bank Rate, which created this exposure to market risk (Fisher,
Frost, and Weeken 2011). (See Figure 10 for clearing spreads during the first iteration of
ILTRs, with spreads on the wider collateral significantly higher for the six-month ILTRs.)
Figure 10: Clearing Spreads for the First Iteration of the ILTRs

Source: Bank of England n.d.b.

In the second iteration of the ILTRs, the Bank introduced a refinement of the minimum
spread, which initially was zero for all collateral pools (Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011). The
new rule allowed minimum spreads to be zero basis points for Level A collateral, five basis
points for Level B, and 15 basis points for Level C collateral (Bank of England 2014a). The
clearing spreads on the ILTRs have only rarely exceeded these minima. (See Figure 11 for a
depiction of clearing spreads over time. Note that the high clearing spreads in 2020 occurred
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the week before and the day after the UK government went into lockdown due to the COVID19 pandemic.)
Figure 11: Clearing Spreads on Second Iteration of the ILTRs

Source: Bank of England n.d.a.

11. Eligible Collateral: The ILTR operations initially utilized two sets of eligible
collateral, but the second iteration added a third set.
First Iteration
From creation until June 2014, the ILTRs had two sets of eligible collateral: “narrow” and
“wider” (Bank of England 2010b). The narrow set of collateral contained the securities
usually eligible for the Bank’s short-term repo operations, which were the highest quality
sovereign securities. The wider set included a larger range of high-quality, but less-liquid
debt securities (Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015). (See Appendix A for a full list of eligible
collateral at creation.)
All of the collateral used for ILTRs had to have underlying cash assets, not synthetic; in other
words, they could not be backed by derivatives positions. Covered bonds and asset-backed
securities issued by—or containing assets originated by—the counterparty were not
eligible. Eligible collateral could be denominated in sterling, euro, US dollars, Australian
dollars, Canadian dollars, Swedish krona, Swiss francs, or Japanese yen (Bank of England
2010b).
The Bank applied the same haircuts to the narrow set of eligible collateral that it uses for the
Bank’s regular set of short-term repo operations. For securities in the wider set of collateral,
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the Bank varied haircuts depending on their interest rates, maturity lengths, and type of
collateral pledged (Bank of England 2010b).
Securities denominated in foreign currencies received an additional haircut of six percentage
points, with yen-denominated securities getting an additional two-percentage-point haircut.
Collateral without an observable market price received a haircut add-on of five percentage
points, and the Bank could apply an unspecified haircut to corporate bonds that were not
well diversified (Bank of England 2010b). (See Appendix B for the full haircut schedule at the
start of the ILTRs.)
Second Iteration
Along with the other adjustments the Bank made to the ILTRs in 2014, the Bank expanded
the eligible sets of collateral, changed their terminology, and standardized the sets across
facilities. The narrow set of collateral became Level A, comprised of high-quality and highly
liquid sovereign securities. The wider set became Level B and consisted of high-quality liquid
collateral such as sovereign, supranational, mortgage, and corporate bonds. In a new
addition, the Bank created Level C, which included less-liquid securitizations, own-name
securities and portfolios of loans (Bank of England 2014a).7
Collateral used in ILTR operations faced the standard Sterling Monetary Framework haircuts
used in other Bank of England operations (Bank of England 2014a).8 These haircuts varied
depending on type of security, maturity of the securities, and whether the security paid a
coupon. There continued to be additional haircuts for currency volatility, inability to observe
a market price, and poorly diversified portfolios of corporate bonds. Since own-name
covered bonds became eligible in the second iteration, they received an additional haircut of
five percentage points (Bank of England 2014c).
The Bank encouraged participants to pre-position their collateral with the Bank ahead of
ILTR operations, with the pre-positioning of Level C collateral required (Bank of England
2014a).
12. Maturity: Initially, the Bank offered both three- and six-month maturities on its
operations but simplified this to only six-month maturities in 2014.
For the first iteration of the ILTRs, the Bank offered two ILTRs with three-month maturities
and one six-month ILTR in each calendar quarter (Bank of England 2010b). Regulatory
liquidity requirements only recognized funding with more than three months of remaining
maturity, which removed the majority of ILTR funds from consideration (Winters 2012).
Along with the other changes made in 2014, the Bank simplified the ILTRs to provide lending

A full list of eligible securities can be found at https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/index.php/library/summarycollateral-eligible-banks-operations.
8 These standard haircuts can be found at https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/summary-haircuts-securitieseligible-banks-lending-operations.
7

1146

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

only on six-month terms (Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015). According to the Bank, this
adjustment allowed for “greater certainty of committed funding” (Bank of England 2013).
13. Other Conditions: There did not appear to be any notable additional conditions
attached to liquidity support.
Research did not determine other conditions involved in the ILTR operations.
14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The Bank lent sterling cash in ILTR
auctions, leading to an impact on the supply of reserves in circulation.
Since the ILTRs were lending sterling cash against eligible collateral, they had an impact on
the supply of reserves to the banking system (Winters 2012).
By indexing the auction interest rates paid by bidders to the Bank Rate, the Bank and the
participants avoided interest-rate risk that could be disruptive to their operations.
Additionally, the Bank conducted comprehensive risk management and monitoring of
collateral used in the operations (including appropriate haircuts) in order to minimize losses
(Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015). (See Figure 12 for an overview of the impacts of central bank
operations depending on the asset involved in the repo agreement.)
Figure 12: Impact of Operations on a Central Bank
Repo of government bonds
Positive when backing banknotes
and unremunerated reserves;
none when backing renumerated
reserves

Repo of private-sector assets
Positive when backing banknotes
and unremunerated reserves;
potentially positive backing
remunerated reserves depending
on the price charge on collateral

Market risk

Small

Modest, depending on collateral

Credit risk

None

Modest, depending on collateral

Churn risk

High, increases as term of repo
decreases

High, increases as term of repo
decreases

Central bank liquidity

High

Depending on the liquidity of the
underlying asset

Central bank income

Source: Rule 2015.

15. Other Options: The Winters Review suggested that the Bank merge the ILTRs with
the Extended Collateral Term Repo (ECTR), which the Bank decided not to do.
In 2012, the Bank of England released the Winters Review, which assessed the Bank of
England’s liquidity provision facilities within the context of the Global Financial Crisis. The
report offered recommendations to the Bank on how to improve its facilities to prepare for
the next crisis. One of these recommendations was to merge the ILTR operations with the
Extended Collateral Term Repo (ECTR), which is a contingency liquidity facility that can be
activated in times of market-wide stress. The ECTRs accepted a much wider set of collateral
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than the ILTRs such as “illiquid but transferrable securities” and “own-name securities and
loans,” but at a high penalty rate (Winters 2012). On the other hand, the ILTR facility typically
accepted collateral that could also be financed on the private market. This had the potential
to cause serious dislocations due to uncertainty surrounding contingent activation of the
ECTRs and the difference in pricing and collateral (Winters 2012). The Winters Review
advised this combination as it would allow the Bank of England to have a regular auction
facility that allowed banks to access term funding against a wider set of collateral (Bank of
England 2013).
The Bank of England stated in 2013 that, while it agreed with the “underlying objective” of
this recommendation by the Winters Review, it would not be merging the ILTRs and ECTRs
(Bank of England 2013). Instead, the Bank created the second iteration of the ILTRs, which
greatly expanded the eligible set of collateral, extended the term to six months, provided for
full allotments, and recalibrated to yield lower prices. It retained the ECTR program in order
to keep an expansive contingent facility in case of a crisis but changed its name to the
Contingent Term Repo Facility (Bank of England 2013).
16. International Coordination: The Bank referred to the ILTR design as “a world first
in central banking.”
There does not appear to have been any international coordination in designing the ILTRs.
In fact, a Deputy Governor of the Bank of England referred to the ILTRs as: “A world first in
central banking…potentially a major step forward in practical policies to support financial
stability” (Klemperer 2018).
The academic responsible for creating the auction format utilized in the ILTRs, Dr. Paul
Klemperer, did present a similar proposal to the US Treasury for its Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), along with Dr. Paul Milgrom. The Treasury intended to use elements of the
product-mix auction for TARP, but Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson dropped this plan in
November 2008 (Klemperer 2018).
17. Communication: The Bank of England released market notices announcing the
auction schedule and changes to the program, as well as communicating directly
with counterparties to educate them on the auction design.
The Bank of England released market notices announcing the auction schedule, as well as
minor changes. The Bank also released a position paper (2010a) explaining the ILTRs, as
well as another paper (2013) to announce the changes in the second iteration to the ILTRs.
Increased usage of ILTR operations during the EU Referendum in 2016 led one auction above
the minimum rate (a rarity), which meant that some participants did not receive any funds.
In response, the Bank held educative conference calls with counterparties to discuss how
bidding behaviors interact with the ILTR auction design (Independent Evaluation Office
2018).
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18. Disclosure: The Bank released aggregated results of the auctions on the day that
they occurred.
The Bank released the results of the operations ten minutes after bidding closed. These
public results included aggregate data on the total amount bid, the amount allocated, the
stop-out spread, and the cover ratio. The results reported these statistics for each collateral
set (Bank of England 2010b).
19. Stigma Strategy: The Bank did not believe that the ILTR operations suffered from
stigma, as a result of their structure and uniform pricing.
The Winters Review (2012) found little evidence that the ILTR operations suffered from
stigma. In announcing the second iteration of the ILTRs, the Bank of England agreed with
that conclusion (Bank of England 2013).
The Bank does not believe that the effectiveness of its market-wide facilities is materially
impaired by stigma … But, to the extent that liquidity insurance is focused on risks more
extreme than those encountered in normal market conditions, complete elimination of
stigma in all cases would be unrealistic.
An evaluation of the Bank’s liquidity operations in 2018 determined that the second iteration
of the ILTRs had little-reported stigma issues (Independent Evaluation Office 2018).
The ILTR operations utilize a uniform pricing structure, where all successful bidders pay the
lowest accepted price (the clearing spread). This style of pricing largely removes the
incentive for bidders to “game” the auctions or attempt to predict other bidders’ choices
(Fisher, Frost, and Weeken 2011). This, paired with the anonymous disclosure of results,
lessened the risk of stigma, since all participants paid the same amount without their true
bids and preferences revealed to the market.
20. Exit Strategy: ILTR operations are a permanent facility in the Sterling Monetary
Framework.
The Bank of England established ILTR operations as a permanent standing facility to provide
liquidity support to the banking sector (Bank of England 2010a). As a result of the auction
design, a lower proportion of available funds are lent against less-liquid collateral in times
of relative stability (Bank of England 2010b). As of 2021, the Bank still conducted weekly
ILTRs.
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Appendixes
Appendix A: Wider Set of Collateral at the Creation of the ILTR Operations
Type of Collateral

Rating

Bonds issued by G10 sovereigns

Aa3/AA- or higher

Bonds issued by G10 government agencies explicitly guaranteed by national
governments

AAA

Conventional debt security issues of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal
Home Loan Banks system

AAA

The most senior tranches of UK and Dutch Prime Residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS); un-listed RMBS not eligible

AAA

UK, German, French, and Spanish regulated covered bonds with an issue size
greater than £1 billion or €1 billion; underlying assets may be UK or EEA social
housing loans, public-sector debt, or prime residential mortgages

AAA

The most senior tranches of UK, US, and EEA asset-backed securities (ABS)
backed by credit cards issued to prime borrowers; un-listed ABS not eligible

AAA

The most senior tranches of UK, US, and EEA prime ABS backed by auto loans
and certain equipment leases; un-listed ABS not eligible

AAA

The most senior tranches of UK, US, and EEA prime ABS backed by student and
consumer loans; un-listed ABS not eligible

AAA

Bank and building society debt guaranteed under HM Government’s Credit
Guarantee Scheme for bank debt

n/a

Senior bank debt that is guaranteed under certain non-UK sovereign bank
debt-guarantee schemes

n/a

Portfolios of senior corporate bonds and commercial paper issued by nonfinancial companies in the UK, US, and EEA; diversification requirement that
no more than 10% of the total value of the portfolio may be from one issuer

A3/Abonds)

Source: Bank of England 2010b.
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Appendix B: Initial Haircuts on Wider Collateral Set during the First Iteration

Source: Bank of England 2010b.
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